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Calm Down about
Common Ownership
The evidence of anticompetitiveharmfrom institutionalinvesting is weak and
theproposedpolicysolutions would be more harmful than the supposedproblem.
e

BY THOMAS A. LAMBERT AND MICHAEL E. SYKUTA

rominent antitrust scholars have recently
sounded alarm bells about large institutional
investors' "common ownership" of competing
businesses. Writing in the Harvard Law Review,
Harvard Law School's Einer Elhauge proclaimed
that "an economic blockbuster has recently been
exposed"-namely, a "small group of institutions has acquired large shareholdings in horizontal competitors
throughout our economy, causing them to compete less vigorously
with each other." In the AntitrustlawJournal,Eric Posner of the University of Chicago and Fiona Scott Morton and Glen Weyl of Yale
University contended that "the concentration of markets through
large institutional investors is the major new antitrust challenge of
our time." Those same authors took to the pages of the New York
Times to argue that "the great, but mostly unknown, antitrust story
of our time is the astonishing rise of the institutional investor ...
and the challenge that it poses to market competition."
Not surprisingly, these scholars have offered solutions to the
alleged problem. Elhauge has called for using the Clayton Act's
Section 7, which precludes anticompetitive mergers, to police
common ownership of minority stakes in competing firms. Posner
et al. have proposed a government enforcement policy that would
encourage institutional investors either to avoid holding stock of
multiple firms in concentrated industries or to limit their influence over such firms by not voting their shares.
These scholars are getting ahead of themselves. There are serious difficulties with both the claim that small-stakes common
ownership poses a significant competitive problem and the solutions the scholars have offered for that purported problem. We
THOMAS A. LAMBERT is the Wall Family Chair in Corporate Law and Governance
at the University of Missouri. MICHAEL E. SYKUTA is associate professor in the division of applied social sciences at the University of Missouri.

show below that the problem's existence has not been adequately
established and that, even if it does exist, the proposed policy
cures would be worse than the disease. First, though, we describe
the alleged problem.
THE PUP
Given the recent explosion in index investing, institutional investors that sponsor index funds-Vanguard, BlackRock, Fidelity,
etc.-are now among the largest shareholders of most publicly
traded companies. They frequently hold significant stakes in all
the firms in an industry. Proponents of restrictions on common
ownership theorize that this pattern of institutional investment
could reduce market competition and they point to empirical
evidence purporting to show that such theoretical harm is, in
fact, occurring.
Theory of harm/ An investor in a single firm within a market-

say, American Airlines-would prefer that the company try to
win business from its rivals. By contrast, an investor holding
stakes in all the firms in a market-American, Delta, Southwest,
and United, if those were the only airlines servicing a particular
route-would not want the firms to compete vigorously. After all,
any gains to one competitor would come at the expense of other
firms in the investor's portfolio.
An investor that is "intra-industry diversified" in this fashion
would prefer maximization of industry profits, whereas a singlefirm investor would prefer that its company maximize own-firm
(i.e., just its own) profits. Corporate managers typically maximize
own-firm profits by growing market share, and they do that by
expanding output, enhancing quality, and discounting prices.
Industry profits, by contrast, are maximized when corporate
managers collectively act like a monopolist by reducing output,

expenditures on product improvements, and discounts from
the levels that would attain in vigorous competition. Because
institutional investors tend to be intra-industry diversified, they
prefer maximization of industry profits and therefore want their
portfolio companies to pull their competitive punches.
But why would corporate managers defer to the interests of
institutional investors when most of their companies' shareholders are not intra-industry diversified? The theory is that institutional investors are better positioned to influence management
decision-making. Relative to individual shareholders, institutional investors possess more extensive monitoring resources and
greater expertise on matters of business strategy and firm policy.
They also hold larger stakes in the corporations in which they
are invested, and they therefore have greater incentive to become
informed before voting their shares in director elections and on
shareholder proposals, executive compensation packages ("sayon-pay"), etc. What's more, the votes of institutional investors
often attract media attention, amplifying such investors' power
over management. Given their greater clout, institutional investors are in a better position to engage corporate managers, and
anecdotal evidence suggests they regularly do so. For all these
reasons, corporate managers often honor the preferences of
institutional investors over those of individual, uncoordinated
stockholders, even when the latter collectively own a greater
proportion of company stock.

Putting all this together generates the two main premises of
the theoretical argument that common ownership by institutional investors softens competition in concentrated industries.
Those premises are:
* Intra-industry diversified institutional investors have an
interestin maximizing industry profits and would prefer that
corporate managers not engage in business-usurping competition that would enhance own-firm profits but reduce
overall profits within the industry.
* Institutional investors have sufficient influence over corporate managers to induce them to refrain from own-firm
profit maximization in favor of greater industry profits.
Both of these premises ultimately prove to be flawed. However,
before we explain those flaws, we first present the evidence often
cited in support of the claim that institutional investing harms
competition.
Evidence of harm Two recent studies-one involving the U.S. airline industry, the other involving commercial banks-purport to
demonstrate that institutional investors' common ownership of
competing firms has reduced competition and injured consumers in concentrated industries.
In "Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership" (the
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airline study), co-authors Jos6 Azar, Martin Schmalz, and Isabel
Tecu tested whether institutional investors' common ownership
of interests in domestic airlines raised airfares higher than they
otherwise would be. To assess common ownership and the degree
to which it changed over time, the authors employed a measurement known as "MHHI delta" (MHHIA).
MHHIA is a component of the "modified HerfindahlHirschman Index" (MHHI), which, as the name suggests, is a
modification of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a wellknown measure used in evaluating the legality of business mergers.
HHI, which ranges from near zero to 10,000 and is calculated by
summing the squares of the market shares of the firms competing
in a market, assesses the degree to which a market is concentrated
and thus susceptible to collusion or oligopolistic coordination.
MHHI endeavors to account for both market concentration
(HHI) and the reduced competition incentives occasioned by
common ownership of the firms within a market. MHHIA is the
part of MHHI that accounts for common ownership incentives,
so MHHI = HHI + MHHIA.
Calculating MHHIA for a particular market is a bit complicated. (For an explanation, see Appendix A of our working
paper listed in the Readings.) For present purposes, it will suffice
to understand what MHHIA purports to measure and which
variables determine its magnitude. MHHIA aims to assess the
degree to which the managers of firms within an industry, on the
assumption that they seek to maximize their shareholders' portfolio returns, would cause their firms to avoid vigorous competition
in an effort to maximize industry rather than own-firm profits.
The primary variables that determine MHHIA are:
* the degree of control intra-industry diversified investors
exercise over the managers of their portfolio firms (the
greater such control, the higher the MHHIA)
* the size of the financial stakes intra-industry diversified
investors hold in the firms within the industry, and the
degree to which, for each such investor, those stakes are
equal across firms (the greater the stakes of intra-industry
diversified shareholders and the more equal those stakes
across firms, the higher the MHHIA)
* the degree to which the firms within the industry have nondiversified shareholders with control over firm management
(the greater the financial stakes and control of investors who
are not intra-industry diversified, the lower the MHHIA)
* the market shares of firms that share common ownership
(the greater their market shares, the greater the market
effect of firm managers' decisions concerning competitive
behavior, and the higher the MHHIA)
In their airline study, Azar et al. first calculated the MHHIA
on each domestic airline route from 2001 to 2014. The authors
then examined, for each route, how changes in the MHHIA
over time correlated with changes in airfares on that route. To

control for route-specific factors that might influence both fares
and the MHHIA, the authors ran a number of regressions. They
concluded that common ownership of air carriers resulted in a
3%-7% increase in fares.
In "Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition" (the banking
study), Azar, Sahil Raina, and Schmalz attempted to assess how
common ownership has affected service fees and interest rates in
local markets for bank deposits. The authors correlated account
fees, the minimum account sizes required to avoid fees (fee thresholds), and interest rates paid on deposits with the "generalized
HHI" (GHHI), a metric similar to MHHI. They concluded that
for interest-bearing checking accounts, a one-standard-deviation
increase in GHHI increased fees by about 11% and fee thresholds
by around 17%. For money market accounts, a similar increase
in GHHI resulted in a 3% increase in fees and a 17% increase in
fee thresholds. The authors also found that increases in GHHI
reduced the interest rates paid to depositors.

There are significant problems with both the theory that smallstakes common ownership causes competitive harm and the
empirical studies purporting to support that theory.
Carefully parsed, common ownership critics' theoretical argument proceeds as follows:
Premise 1:

Because institutional investors are intra-industry
diversified, they benefit if their portfolio firms
seek to maximize industry, rather than own-firm,
profits.
Premise2: Corporate managers seek to maximize the returns
of their corporations' largest shareholders-intraindustry diversified institutional investors-and
will thus pursue maximization of industry profits.
Premise3: Industry profits, unlike own-firm profits, are maximized when producers refrain from underpricing
their rivals to win business.
Conclusion: Intra-industry diversification by institutional
investors reduces price competition and should be
restricted.
The first two premises of this argument are, at best, questionable.
Inter-industrydiversification/ With respect to Premise 1, it is
unlikely that intra-industry diversified institutional investors
benefit from, and thus prefer, maximization of industry rather
than own-firm profits. That is because intra-industry diversified
mutual funds tend also to be inter-industry diversified, and maximizing one industry's profits requires supracompetitive pricing
that tends to reduce the profits of firms in complementary industries. Vanguard's Value Index Fund, for example, holds around
2% of each major airline (1.85% of United, 2.07% of American,
2.15% of Southwest, and 1.99% of Delta), but also holds:
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* 1.88% of Expedia Inc. (a major retailer of airline tickets)
* 2.20% of Boeing Co. (a manufacturer of commercial jets)
* 2.02% of United Technologies Corp. (a jet engine producer)

* 3.14% of AAR Corp. (the largest domestic provider of commercial aircraft maintenance and repair)
* 1.43% of Hertz Global Holdings Inc. (a major automobile
rental company)
* 2.17% of Accenture (a consulting firm for which air travel is
a significant cost component)
Each of those companies-and many others-perform worse
when airlines engage in the sort of supracompetitive pricing (and
corresponding reduction in output) that maximizes profits in
the airline industry. The very logic suggesting that intra-industry
diversification causes investors to prefer less competition necessarily suggests that inter-industry diversification would counteract that incentive.
Manager incentives/ Premise 2, the claim that corporate managers will pursue industry rather than own-firm profits when their
largest shareholders prefer that outcome, is similarly dubious.
For nearly all companies in which intra-industry diversified
institutional investors collectively hold a significant proportion of outstanding shares, a majority of the stock is still held
by shareholders who are not intra-industry diversified. There
are several reasons to doubt that corporate managers would
routinely disregard the interests of shareholders owning the
bulk of the company's stock and pursue industry rather than
own-firm profits.
For one thing, favoring intra-industry diversified investors
holding a minority interest could subject managers to legal liability. The fiduciary duties of corporate managers require that they
attempt to maximize firm profits for the benefit of shareholders
as a whole; favoring even a controlling shareholder (much less a
minority shareholder) at the expense of other shareholders can
result in liability.
More importantly, managers' personal interests usually align
with those of the majority when it comes to the question of
whether to maximize own-firm or industry profits. As sellers in
the market for managerial talent, corporate managers benefit
from reputations for business success, and they can best burnish such reputations by beating-winning business from-their
industry rivals. In addition, many corporate managers are compensated in stock of the companies they manage. They maximize
the value of that stock by maximizing own-firm, not industry,
profits. It thus seems unlikely that corporate managers would
ignore the interests of stockholders owning a majority of shares
and cause their corporations to refrain from business-usurping
competition.
Confusing institutionswith fundholders/ When confronted with

criticisms of their theory of anticompetitive harm, proponents of
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common ownership restrictions generally point to the empirical
evidence in the two studies described above. The authors of the
airline study, for example, greeted a criticism of their theory with
the retort, "This argument falls short of explaining why, empirically, taking into account shareholders' economic interests does
help to explain firms' product market behavior."
Of course, to demonstrate "empirically" that institutional
investors' "economic interests" influence their portfolio companies' "product market behavior" (i.e., cause the companies to
charge higher prices, etc.), researchers would need to correctly
identify institutional investors' economic interests with respect
to their portfolio firms' product market behavior and establish
that those interests cause firms to act as they do. On those crucial
tasks, the airline and banking studies fall short.
In assessing institutional investors' economic interests, the
studies have assumed that if an institutional investor reports
holding a similar percentage of each firm in a market-say, 5%
of the stock of each major airline-then it must have an "economic interest" in maximizing industry rather than own-firm
profits. Such an assumption is unwarranted. That is because each
institutional investor's reported holdings, set forth on forms it
must submit under Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange
Act, aggregate its holdings across all its funds. Such aggregation
paints a misleading picture of the institutional investor's actual
economic interest.
For example, while Vanguard's Section 13(f) filing reports
ownership of a similar percentage ofAmerican, Delta, Southwest,
and United Airlines-suggesting an economic interest in industry profit maximization-the picture looks very different at the
individual fund level:
* Vanguard's Value Index Fund (VIVAX) holds significant
stakes in American, Delta, and United (0.46%, 0.45%, and
0.42%, respectively), but holds no Southwest stock. VIVAX
does best if United, American, and Delta usurp business
from Southwest.
* Vanguard's Growth Index Fund (VIGRX) holds a significant
stake in Southwest (0.59%), but holds no stake in American, Delta, or United. Investors in VIGRX would prefer that
Southwest win business from American, Delta, and United.
* Vanguard's Mid-Cap Index Fund (VIMSX) and Mid-Cap
Value Index Fund (VMVIX) hold significant stakes in
United (1.00% and 0.32 1%, respectively), but hold no stock
in American, Delta, or Southwest. Investors in VIMSX and
VMVIX would prefer that United win business from American, Delta, and Southwest.
* Vanguard's PRIMECAP Core Fund (VPCCX) holds stakes in
all four major airlines, but its share of Southwest (1.49%) is
twice its share of American (0.72%), nearly four times its share
of United (0.38%), and seven-and-a-half times its share of
Delta (0.198%). Investors in VPCCX would prefer that Southwest grow at the expense of American, United, and Delta.
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They would also prefer that American win business from
United and Delta, and that United win business from Delta.
We could go on, but the point should be clear: because returns
to retail investors in the funds of Vanguard and similar institutions turn on fund performance, the competitive outcome that
maximizes retail investors' profits will differ among funds.
Mistaking institutionalinvestors' incentives / Proponents of

restrictions on common ownership might respond that even
if an institutional investor's individual funds have conflicting
preferences, the institutional investor as an entity must have some
preference about whether to maximize industry profits or the
profits of a particular company. Because it cannot honor all its
individual funds' conflicting preferences with respect to competitive outcomes, the institutional investor will settle on the compromise strategy that maximizes its individual funds' aggregate
returns: industry profit maximization. Such a strategy would be
the first choice of the institution's funds holding relatively equal
shares of all firms within a market. And, while the first choice of
the institution's funds that are disproportionately invested in
one firm would be to maximize that firm's profits, those funds
would do better with industry profit maximization than with the
first-choice strategy of other of the institution's funds, i.e., those
that are disproportionately invested in a different firm.
But even if maximization of industry profits leads to the greatest aggregate returns for an institutional investor's funds, such a
strategy may not be the best outcome for the institutional investor
itself An institutional investor typically wants to maximize its
profits, which will grow as it attracts retail investors into its funds
versus those of its competitors and steers those investors toward
the funds that earn it the greatest profits (fees less costs). To assess
an institutional investor's preferences with regard to the returns
of its different funds, then, one must know the degree to which
each fund's attractiveness vis-a-vis rivals' similar funds turns on
portfolio returns, and the profit margin each fund delivers to the
institutional investor.
For funds tracking popular stock indices, portfolio returns
play little role in winning business from rival fund sponsors. (For
example, higher returns on the stocks in the S&P 500 are unlikely
to attract investors to BlackRock's S&P 500 index fund over Fidelity's or Vanguard's.) Moreover, the fees charged on such funds,
and thus the institutional investor's potential profit margins, are
extraordinarily low. For actively managed funds, portfolio returns
are far more significant in attracting investors, and management
fees are higher. The upshot is that an institutional investor, in
determining what competitive outcome it prefers, will attach
little weight to the competitive preferences of passive index funds
and more weight to the preferences of actively managed funds,
with that weight growing as the funds provide the institutional
investor with higher profit margins.
It is quite possible, then, for an intra-industry diversified

institutional investor to prefer a competitive outcome other than
the maximization ofindustry profits, even if industry profit maximization would maximize the aggregate returns of its individual
funds. Consider, for example, an institutional investor that offers
funds similar to the following Vanguard funds:
* Vanguard's 500 Index Fund (VFIAX) holds near equivalent
interests in American, Delta, Southwest, and United and
would thus do best with a strategy of industry profit maximization. Its expense ratio (annual fees divided by total fund
amount) is 0.04 percent.
* Vanguard's Value Index Fund (VIVAX) holds similar stakes
in American, Delta, and United but does not hold Southwest stock. Its expense ratio is 0.18 percent.
* Vanguard's PRIMECAP Core Fund (VPCCX) holds a much
higher stake in Southwest than in the other airlines and has
an expense ratio of 0.46 percent, 2.5 times as great as the noSouthwest VIVAX fund and 11.5 times as high as the fully
diversified VFIAX fund.
* Vanguard's Capital Opportunity Fund (VHCAX) holds significantly higher shares of Southwest and United (1.74% and
1.55%, respectively) than of Delta and American (0.65% and
1.16%, respectively). Its expense ratio is 0.38, more than twice
as great as the no-Southwest VIVAX fund and 9.5 times the
fully diversified VFIAX fund.
This institutional investor's Southwest-heavy funds (those
resembling Vanguard's VPCCX and VHCAX funds) charge
much higher fees than its fully diversified index fund (the one
resembling VFIAX, for which fund returns are unimportant)
and significantly higher fees than its funds that are more heavily
invested in airlines besides Southwest (those resembling VIVAX).
Despite being intra-industry diversified at the institutional level,
this institutional investor may do best if Southwest maximizes
own-firm profits.
The point here is that discerning an institutional investor's
actual economic interest requires drilling down to the level of its
individual funds, something the common ownership studies have
not done. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the airline study's
authors, the common ownership studies have not shown "empirically" that "taking into account shareholders' economic interests
does help to explain firms' product market behavior." Simply put,
they have never established what those economic interests are.
Endogenous measure / Even if institutional investors' aggregated holdings accurately revealed their economic interests with
respect to competitive outcomes, the common ownership studies
would still be deficient because they fail to show that those economic interests caused portfolio firms' "product market behavior."
As explained above, the common ownership studies employ
MHHIA (or a similar measure) to assess institutional investors'
interests in competition-softening. They then correlate changes
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in that metric with changes in portfolio firms' pricing behavior.
The problem is that MHHIA is itself affected by factors that
independently influence market prices. It is thus improper to
infer that changes in MHHIA caused changes in portfolio firms'
pricing practices; the pricing changes could have resulted from
the very factors that changed MHHIA. In other words, MHHIA
is an endogenous measure.
To see why this is so, consider the three-step process involved
in calculating MHHIA. The first step is to assess, for every coupling of competing firms in the market (e.g., Southwest/Delta,
United/American, Southwest/United, etc.), the degree to which
the controlling investors in each of the firms would prefer that it
avoid competing with the other. The second step considers the
market shares of the two firms in the coupling to determine the
competitive significance of their incentives not to compete with
each other. (The idea is that reduced head-to-head competition
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the other airlines. The market shares of the airlines in the high
season are equal: 25% each.
On these facts, the increase in demand causes MHHIA to rise
from 7,200 to 7,500. But the increase in demand is also likely to
raise ticket prices. We thus see an increase in MHHIA that correlates with an increase in ticket prices, but the price change is
not caused by the change in MHHIA. Instead, the two changes
have a common independent cause.
Endogeneity also creeps in during the third step in calculating
MHHIA. In that step, the "cross MHHIAs" of all the couplings in
the market-the metrics assessing for each coupling the extent to
which common ownership will cause the two firms to compete
less vigorously-are summed. As the number of firms participating in the market-and thus the number of couplings-increases,
the MHHIA will tend to rise. While HHI (the market concentration measure) will decrease as the number of competing firms
rises, MHHIA (the measure of common
ownership pricing incentives) will increase.
rIj
For example, suppose again that five
institutional investors hold equal stakes
(say, 3%) of each airline servicing a market
and that the airlines have no other significant shareholders. If there are two airlines
servicing the market and their market
shares are equivalent, HHI will be 5,000,
MHHIA will be 5,000, and MHHI (HHI +
MHHIA) will be 10,000. If a third airline
enters and grows so that the three airlines
have equal market shares, HHI will drop to 3,333, MHHIA will rise
to 6,667, and MHHI will remain constant at 10,000. If a fourth
airline enters and the airlines split the market evenly, HHI will
fall to 2,500, MHHIA will rise further to 7,500, and MHHI will
again total 10,000.
This is problematic because the number of participants in
the market is affected by consumer demand, which also affects
market prices. In the market described above, for example, the
third or fourth airline might enter the market in response to
an increase in demand, and that increase might simultaneously
cause market price to rise. We would see, then, a price increase
that is correlated with, but not caused by, an increase in MHHIA;
increased demand would be the cause of both the higher prices
and the increase in MHHIA.
In the end, then, the empirical evidence of competition-softening from common ownership is not the smoking gun proponents
of common ownership restrictions proclaim it to be.

It is improper to infer that changes in MH
caused changes inportfoliofirms'pricingpra-tices

The pricingchanges could have resultedfrom
the very factors that changedMHHIA.

by bit players matters less for overall market competition than
does reduced competition by major players.) The final step is to
aggregate the effect of common ownership-induced competition-softening throughout the overall market by summing the
softened competition metrics for each coupling of competitors
within the market.
Given this process for calculating MHHIA, there are at least
two sources of endogeneity in the metric. One arises because
of the second step. To assess the significance to market competition of any two firms' incentives to reduce competition
between themselves, the market shares of those two firms must
be incorporated into the metric. But factors that influence
market shares may also influence market prices apart from any
common ownership effect.
Suppose, for example, that five institutional investors hold
significant and equal stakes (say, 3%) in each of the four airlines
servicing a particular air route and that none of the airlines has
another significant shareholder. The air route at issue is subject
to seasonal demand fluctuations. In the low season, the market
is divided among the four airlines so that one has 40% of the
business and the other three have 20% each. The MHHIA for
this market would be 7,200. When the high season rolls around,
demand for flights along the route increases, but the leading
airline is capacity constrained, so additional ticket sales go to

Even if common ownership by institutional investors did cause
some degree of competition-softening in oligopolistic industries,
the solutions that have been proposed for the problem would
not be justified.
Under Elhauge's proposal to police common ownership
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using the Clayton Act's Section 7 (which, by its literal terms,
precludes stock acquisitions that tend to lessen market competition), liability would result from "any horizontal stock acquisitions that have created, or would create, a MHHIA of over 200
in a market with an MHHI over 2500" if "those horizontal stock
acquisitions raised prices or are likely to do so." Posner et al.
advocate a more determinate, rule-based approach. They would
have the federal antitrust enforcement agencies compile annual
lists of oligopolistic industries and then threaten enforcement
action against any institutional investor holding more than 1%
of the stock in such an industry if the investor held stock in
more than one firm within the industry and either voted its
shares or engaged firm managers.
The administrative costs of these proposed solutions, coupled
with the losses they would create by eliminating welfare-enhancing arrangements, would swamp any welfare benefits they secured.
Administrativecosts/ Both of the proposed approaches would
impose tremendous decision costs on business planners and
adjudicators. Because institutional investors cannot prevent
market prices from rising, institutional investors seeking to
avoid liability under Elhauge's approach would have to monitor
MHHI and MHHIA in the markets in which they were invested
to ensure that the relevant thresholds were not exceeded. The
monitoring would have to continue perpetually, for MHHI and
MHHIA change constantly based on factors beyond an institutional investor's control (e.g., the market shares of the competing
firms, stock ownership percentages of other investors). If the
MHHI and MHHIA thresholds were crossed and a lawsuit filed,
adjudicators would have to weigh complex evidence like that
presented in the airline study to determine whether common
ownership had caused or was threatening an adverse price effect.
Evaluating complicated econometric studies is beyond the competence of most judges and virtually all juries.
Posner et al.'s bright line approach might initially seem to
reduce the decision costs for business planners, but because the
approach says only when government enforcement actions will be
brought, it would hardly reduce business planners' burdens; they
would still have to monitor MHHI and MHHIA to avoid liability
in private antitrust lawsuits. Moreover, the Posner et al. approach
would saddle enforcers with the herculean task of compiling, and
annually updating, lists of oligopolies. Given that the antitrust
agencies frequently struggle with the far more modest task of
defining markets in the small number of merger challenges they
file each year, there is little reason to believe enforcers could
perform their oligopoly- designating duties at a reasonable cost.
Error costs/ Even greater than the proposed solutions' administrative costs are their likely "error costs"-i.e., the welfare losses
that would stem from wrongly deterring welfare-enhancing
arrangements. Such costs would result if, as is likely, institutional
investors were to respond to the policy solutions by making one

of the two changes proponents of the solutions appear to prefer:
either refraining from intra-industry diversification or remaining fully passive in the industries in which they hold stock of
multiple competitors.
Ifinstitutional investors were to seek to avoid liability by investing in only one firm per concentrated industry, retail investors
would lose access to a number of attractive investment opportunities. Passive index funds, which offer retail investors instant
diversification with extremely low fees (because of the lack of
active management), would virtually disappear, as most major
stock indices include multiple firms per industry.
Moreover, because critics of common ownership maintain
that intra-industry diversification at the institutional investor level
is sufficient to induce competition- softening in concentrated
markets, each institutional investor would have to settle on one
firm per concentrated industryfor all itsfunds. That requirement
would impede institutional investors' ability to offer a variety of
actively managed funds organized around distinct investment
strategies-e.g., growth, value, income etc. If, for example, Southwest Airlines were a growth stock and United Airlines a value
stock, an institutional investor could not offer both a growth
fund including Southwest and a value fund including United.
Finally, institutional investors could not offer funds designed
to bet on an industry while limiting exposure to company-specific
risks within that industry. Suppose, for example, that a financial
crisis led to a precipitous drop in the stock prices of all commercial banks. A retail investor might reasonably conclude that the
market had overreacted with respect to the industry as a whole,
that the industry would likely rebound, but that some commercial
banks would probably fail. Such an investor would wish to invest
in the commercial banking sector but hold a diversified portfolio
within that sector. A legal regime that drove fund families to avoid
intra-industry diversification would prevent them from offering
the sort of fund this investor would prefer.
Of course, if institutional investors were to continue intraindustry diversification and seek to avoid liability by remaining passive in industries in which they were diversified, the
funds described above could still be offered to investors. In that
case, though, another set of significant error costs would arise:
increased agency costs in the form of managerial misfeasance.
Unlike most individual shareholders, institutional investors
often hold significant stakes in public companies and have the
resources to become informed on corporate matters. They have
a stronger motive and greater opportunity to monitor firm managers and are thus particularly well-poised to keep managers on
their toes. Institutional investors with long-term investor horizons-including all index funds, which cannot divest from their
portfolio companies if firm performance suffers-have proven
particularly beneficial to firm performance. Indeed, a recent study
byJarrad Harford, Ambrus Kecsk6s, and Sattar Mansi found that
investment by long-term institutional investors enhanced the
quality of corporate managers, reduced measurable instances
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of managerial misbehavior, boosted innovation, decreased debt
maturity (causing firms to become more exposed to financial
market discipline), and increased shareholder returns. It strains
credulity to suppose that this laundry list of benefits could similarly be achieved by long-term institutional investors that had
no ability to influence managerial decision-making by voting
their shares or engaging managers. Opting for passivity to avoid
antitrust risk, then, would prevent institutional investors from
achieving their agency cost-reducing potential.

Proponents of additional antitrust intervention to police common ownership simply have not made their case. Their theory
as to why current levels of intra-industry diversification would
cause consumer harm is implausible and the empirical evidence
they say demonstrates such harm is both scant and methodologically suspect. The policy solutions they have proposed for dealing
with the purported problem would radically rework an industry
that has provided substantial benefits to investors, raising the
costs of portfolio diversification and enhancing agency costs at
public companies. Courts and antitrust enforcers should reject
their calls for additional antitrust intervention to police common ownership.
1
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